Are moral claims the kinds of things we can be right about? Can they be true?
What’s the debate about?
The question which lies at the heart of the debate between cognitivism and non-cognitivism regarding moral judgements is the following: are moral judgements truth-apt (are they the kinds of things which can be true or false)?
What’s the difference between these two positions?
The cognitivistproffers two claims, that:
(i) moral judgements are cognitive states (such as beliefs), and
(ii) moral judgements are truth-apt (Fisher 6).
If moral judgements are truth-apt, do we ever get them right?
The non-cognitivist, in contrast, denies that moral judgements are truth-apt, and instead posits that moral judgements are non-cognitive states, such as emotions (7).
In denying the truth-aptitude of moral judgements, this looming question (of whether we can be correct) becomes irrelevant. The position which A.J. Ayer, a non-cognitivist, holds with respect to this question is referred to as emotivism.
A Brief Schema
In following paragraphs I will attempt two things:
(i) to give an account of Ayer’s emotivism, and
(ii) offer a critique of it in light of Cian Dorr’s claims against non-cognitivism generally.
What is Emotivism in Metaethics?
A.J. Ayer’s concern, broadly, is whether statements of ethical value (moral judgements) can be translated into statements of empirical (i.e., empirically verifiable) fact (Ayer 17).
For example, subjectivists and utilitarians contend that moral[1] judgements compose “a sub-class of psychological or sociological judgements” (17). If this were the case (and it is not), moral judgements would not be generically different from statements of fact (17).
Ayer’s contention, contra subjectivists and utilitarians, is that
“[S]entences which contain normative ethical symbols are not equivalent to sentences which express psychological propositions, or… empirical propositions” (17).
This contention specifically applies to normative ethical symbols, as opposed to descriptive symbols (17–18).
For example, if the sentence “X is wrong” is meant to be understood as containing a normative ethical symbol (a moral judgement concerning a certain kind of conduct), it does not express a proposition which can be verified through empirical investigation (18).
If, however, it is meant to be understood as containing a descriptive ethical symbol (that, to a certain group of people at a certain point in time, with certain mores, “X is wrong”) this is empirically investigable (18).
Ayer’s Claim: Normativity is not Empirical
Moral concepts such as “wrongness” do not permit of being analyzed as there is no criterion by which their validity can be tested (18).
Moral concepts are, as a result of this inability, “pseudo-concepts” (18). Ethical symbols thus neither add or detract from the factual (empirical) content of the sentences in which they feature (18). For example, if one were to say: “You acted wrongly in stealing that money”, this merely means “You stole that money” (18). The use of the adverb “wrongly” or adjective “wrong” adds nothing to the factual content of the sentence; it expresses no proposition which can be true or false (18).
Moral judgements then, are not factual statements (as in denoting a fact of the matter), nor are they psychological statements (as in denoting a state of mind), both of which are capable of validation (18).
Moral Judgements are the Expression of Moral Sentiment
In making a moral judgement, one is merely the evincingone’s feelings (18). In every case in which one makes an moral judgement (such as those normative ethical statements “X is wrong”), the functionof the ethical word is “emotive” (19). While normative ethical symbols are used to express a feeling, they do not make any genuine assertions about that feeling (19).
They are not propositions or genuine assertions much in the same way as a cry of pain or a command; these expressions simply are, without an attempt at claiming truth or falsity, or making a statement about a facet of the world(19).
Making a moral judgement, such as “X is wrong” is, in essence, recoiling (rather than reporting that one is recoiling), or saying “Bleh!” (rather than claiming that one is saying this). As moral judgements are not genuine assertions, they have no objective validity, and so their validity cannot be determined by a criterion (19). Though the distinction between expression and assertion is complicated (as the two tend to go together), expressing a feeling is not the same as asserting that one has a certain feeling – expression does not necessarily entail assertion (19).[2]
A Response to Ayer: Emotivism Destroys Rational Discourse
Ayer’s emotivism, while to some may appear a convincing account of the nature of moral judgements, brings with it serious consequences for rational discourse.
The emotivist must provide an explanation of logical reasoning involving premises which consist in moral judgements, and how this can be conducted, if moral judgements are not truth-apt and do not involve cognitive states such as beliefs.
In the absence of any satisfactory account, it would seem that non-cognitivism about moral judgements clashes with our intuitive notions of rationality and logical reasoning. Cian Dorr’s claim that, if non-cognitivism were true, rational discourse and subsequent alteration of beliefs would amount to wishful thinking, is pertinent here (Dorr 99).
Dorr’s Response to Ayer: Emotivism is Wishful Thinking
The program, as seems to be evident from Dorr’s claims, is as follows.
Take a rule of logic, for instance, modus ponens.
Create a syllogism such that one of the premises is that which would be regarded by a non-cognitivist as a non-cognitive state – such as the disapproval of X, or the desire to prevent X, or the internalization of norms with respect to X (97).
In the case of Ayer’s emotivism, one could describe this non-cognitive state as the representation of certain feelings with regard to X (e.g., “Bleh! X!”).
Imagine an instance of inference from P1 and P2 to C: the caveat being that the individual in question initially accepts P1, and only comes to later accept P2, and, by conclusion, C. An example of such being:
P1. If stealing is wrong, I shouldn’t steal books fromThe Strand.[3]
P2. Stealing is wrong.
C. I shouldn’t steal books from The Strand.
How does Dorr’s Response Work?
We prize our title as supposedly rational beings.
The non-cognitivist must tell a story of how it would be rational for the individual in question to arrive at the conclusion, C, through the acceptance of premise P2, despite the fact that: (i) P2 involves a non-cognitive state which is not a beliefor something akin to it (and thus is irrational,e.g., “Bleh! X!”), and (ii) some essential change is involved in the process of first denying and later accepting P2 which is non-cognitive, and yet somehow affects the individual in question such that they can have a change of belief(98–99).
If non-cognitivism about moral judgements is true generally, it cannot be rational to infer factual conclusions from arguments which involve moral judgements as premises (100). The acceptance of P2 can only be rational if there is a substantial change in either the individual’s cognitive statein the process of coming to believe P2, or in their evidence for believing P2 (99).
Given that non-cognitivism about moral judgements holds that moral judgements are not cognitive states (on Ayer’s position, the non-cognitive evincement of emotion), changes to these non-cognitive states with the result that the individual comes to change a belief, or believe in something else, does not make such belief rational (101).
To attempt to contort one’s views about reality in accordance with one’s feelings is wishful thinking (99).
The reason as to why this clashes with our intuitive notions about rationality and rational discourse is that it renders conclusions from arguments involving premises containing non-cognitive states (e.g., moral judgements) irrational (102). These arguments seem, with respect to their form, however, coherent (that the premises are somehow “factually” related to the subject matter)and logically valid (102).
The problem, put succinctly, is that the non-cognitivist seems to uproot from these cases what is, admittedly, immediate, straightforward and intuitive reasoning, and in doing so must provide a convincing account as why such reasoning, though mistaken, is so.
Works Cited:
- “Introduction .” Metaethics: An Introduction, by Andrew Fisher, Routledge Taylor and Francis, 2014, pp. 1–9.
- Ayer, A. J. “‘A Critique of Ethics’ .” Ethical Theory: An Anthology, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, Second Edition ed., John Wiley & Sons, Inc. , 2013, pp. 16–21.
- Cian Dorr. “Non-Cognitivism and Wishful Thinking.” Noûs, vol. 36, no. 1, 2002, p. 97–103. EBSCOhost, login.avoserv2.library.fordham.edu/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.3506104&site=eds-live.
Footnotes:
[1] The terms “moral” and “ethical” will be used interchangeably.
[2] Though tempting, I do not herein invoke Geach or the Frege-Geach problem in critiquing Ayer.
[3] While this would likewise be a pertinent critique, I set aside, for the purposes of this paper, the Embedding Problem.