Epicurean ethics and why to love is insane
Epicurus on pleasure
When Epicurus thinks of pleasure as the end goal of all action he is not necessarily referring to particularly titillating pleasures of the body (e.g. as an epicure would), but the pleasure that supervenes in the removal of pain.
The goal of pleasure: freedom from pain in body and mind
The greatest kind of pleasure is that of freedom from pain, both in the body (i.e. aponia) and in the mind (i.e. ataraxia), and is a kind of katastematic (to be examined momentarily) pleasure, freedom from disturbance (Brown 104).
Definitions of pleasure
Epicurus’ definition of pleasure is twofold, in that there are two kinds of pleasure: (i) kinetic and (ii) katastematic pleasures (104).
Kinetic(i.e. “in change”) pleasures are the kind of which one speaks in modern parlance, the pleasures of touch, sight, taste, and sound, which are much intenser and much more transitory than katastematic pleasures (104).
Katastematic (i.e. “standing still”) pleasures are the kind which occur in the negation, and absence, of pain (104).
For example, the state of being satisfied after having been thirsty is a katastematic pleasure; to sate one’s thirst by drinking expensive, boxed water is a kinetic pleasure (104). While kinetic pleasures may be pursued if they do not lead to harm (which they often do), they are not sufficient in producing the truly happy life (105).
Three divisions of pleasure
Epicurus, in order to aid the novice in their selection of pleasures, devised a classification of desires as guide for making correct choices (105).
There are three kinds of desires:
(1) natural and necessary (which produce katastematic pleasure),
(2) natural and unnecessary (which produce kinetic pleasures), and
(3) unnatural and unnecessary (which produce kinetic pleasures) (105).
Natural desires stem from the physical needs and the condition of the body, as opposed to a mental whim; necessary desires are those which are essential for the attainment of happiness, physical well-being, or the preservation of life (105–6).
The main necessary and natural desires are those for food, clothing, and shelter; these result in pain or death if left unsatisfied (106). Those desires which are natural and unnecessary are, broadly, sensual desires, such as the desire for gourmet food, or sexual intercourse (106). These may be pursued if the adherent is left unharmed (i.e. if no harm is accrued in consequence of pursuing them), but can be neglected without physical detriment (106).
Unnatural and unnecessary desires are the result of “empty” or “misguided” opinions, such as the pursuit of political power, or wealth (106). Epicurus also believed that pleasure permits of limits, and that there was no greater pleasure than the removal of pain (106). Physical pleasure is reached when all pain is taken away, and mental pleasure is the absence of states such as fear or anxiety (106).
The limit of pleasure: the absence of pain
The limit of natural and necessary desires is met rather easily through the removal of pain (e.g. eating), and natural and unnecessary desires are limited in that their physical basis (e.g. sexual desire) is easily satisfied (106). Unnatural and unnecessary desires, however, permit no limit, and are never satisfied (107). One particular natural and unnecessary desire, that of sensuality in the form of love.
Lucretius on love
A preliminary
The term “love” is, at best, an inadequate translation for the concepts of the Greek term eros (to which Epicurus refers) and its Latin translation amor(to which Lucretius, the first century Roman Epicurean, author of the De Rerum Natura, refers).
Eros is a complex emotion
The uppermost part of eros is that of uncontrollable sexual desire, though eros permits of qualities (e.g. strong emotional attachment) which are familiar to a modern audience (111). It can be best described as passion ( pathos in Greek), in modern parlance we would speak of “emotions,” or an affectionof the soul which verges on mental illness (111).
Though it sometimes may be conducive to the notions of tenderness and spirituality which underlie the modern parlance of love, this is better covered by the term philia (111–2). Amor is a much more ambiguous term which lies between these two, in that its connotations of strong attachment may be physical, but emotional and intellectual as well (112).
Love is a kind of madness
The Epicurean stance on love (and, broadly speaking, other sensual desires), as embodied by Epicurus, can be found in Book IV of Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura.
Love, in the context of this philosophical discussion, is described as a pathos, and being such is to be subject to a forcible removal by the individual – one must rid oneself of love (112). The Epicurean rejection of it stands on the grounds that it is a destructive, obsessive, intense desire, focused on and projected onto a particular individual (112–3). It has deleterious effects both for the lover and the beloved.
If left unchecked, it leads to a kind of frenzied madness (112–3). Not only does this mental pain stem from the false or “empty” opinion that sex is an absolute necessity, there are various maligned opinions about the nature of the beloved (e.g. “they are the most beautiful in the world”, “They would never leave me”) to which the lover clings (115).
These false notions culminate in a deadly delusion; charged with uncontrollable desire, the pursuit of the beloved afflicts the mind of the lover with the frustration and anxiety that only could result from attempting to quench an unsatisfiable passion (115).
Rid ourselves of love?
Love is thus akin to a sickness or madness.
The commonsense remedy which Epicurus prescribes is that of complete separation from the object of desire. Lucretius, in this same vein of thought, attempts to alter the false opinions of the lover – by dismantling them, showing them to be untrue or misguided.
But that doesn’t sound like what we consider love to be, does it?
Maybe it should be.
Works Cited:
- Brown, Robert D. Lucretius on Love and Sex: A Commentary on De Rerum Natura I, 1030–1287 with Prolegomena, Text and, Translation. E. J. Brill, Kobenhavn, 1987.