Cartesian epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy that’s actually still relevant.
Introduction:
François Poulain de la Barre ( 1648–1723), 17th century French philosopher, intellectual progressive, and Catholic priest, is notable for his work on gender equality, his treatise On the Equality of the Two Sexes.
Poulain’s work arises toward the end of a long-standing period of debate in European cultural and intellectual history, wherein pre-established norms of gender inequality were challenged and questioned; he is arguably the first example of Cartesian Feminism.
Belief in gender inequality begins in ignorance
“We are full of prejudices” Poulain writes “and… we have to make a real effort to get rid of them before we can hope to come to a clear and distinct understanding” (Barre, Bosley, & Welch 49).
Poulain’s arguments for the equality of the sexes are Cartesian in character: only beliefs which are founded upon clear and distinct ideas can be true.
In Cartesian philosophy, these are notions which are so fundamental to knowledge and experience that they cannot (seemingly) be doubted, e.g., Descartes’ famous expression, “I think therefore I am.”
On the question of the equality of the sexes, the commonly-held belief in the inferiority of women is the result of prejudice and error (50).
In the face of examination, it is rationally untenable (50).
Poulain demonstrates this conclusion through a method he refers to as “the application of the rule of truth” (50). The rule of truth consists in this: nothing ought to be accepted as being true unless it is furnished by clear and distinct ideas (50).
Rooting out ignorance: attack their supporting beliefs
One particular belief supporting the inferiority of women which Poulain proves as unjustified is as follows:
(Supporting Belief) “[W]omen… are not as intelligent as men” (50).
This belief possesses several entailments, which Poulain dismisses in dismantling this initial belief; several of which are as follows:
(i) Women as incapable of taking on roles in public life and the sciences (50).
(ii) Intellectual and professional distinctions between the sexes are justified (50).
(iii) Women deserve the status of being inferior to men (50).
Upon the application of his method, this belief (Supporting Belief) is found to be untenable, as it is predicated upon hearsay (50). The sexes are equal, and women are endowed with the same gifts of intelligence as men (50).
Poulain demonstrates this particular claim by reference to, and inference from, Cartesian metaphysics: the differences between men and women are localized to the body, not the mind.
The difference between the sexes: bodies, and not minds
“The difference between the two sexes” claims Poulain, “is limited to the body, since that is the only part used in the reproduction of humankind” (82).
This claim is rooted in several of Poulain’s observations which are in accordance with, and informed by, his understanding Descartes’ substance dualism.
Poulain’s argument: all minds are essentially similar
In so far as this claim is directed at refuting (Supporting Belief)[2], Poulain fields the following argument (my representation):
(P1) The minds of men (being equal) do not substantially differ from one another (82).
(Implied-P1) The state of being embodied is fundamentally the same in all men (82).
(P2) The state of being embodied is fundamentally the same in both sexes (82).
((P3), from P1+P2) The minds of women do not differ substantially from those of men.
((P4), from P3) The minds of women are thus just as capable as the minds of men.
((P5), from P4) The minds of women and men are equal.
(c) Women and men are equal.
A closer look at the premises
(P1) stems from Poulain’s observation that the minds of men, generally, are equal in terms of capability.
The mind generally can comprehend various concepts and is exercised by these concepts (82). The ability to contemplate mental objects and to understand them (to such an extent as to be “grasped” clearly, in the same way as sense perceptible objects) is a capacity which can be developed (82). The difference between minds is one of content, not capability or substance, as is conspicuous in individuals of different ages and refinement (82). (P1) also implies, as Poulain openly states in the case of men and women, that the state of being embodied (the union) is fundamentally the same.
(P2) arises from Poulain’s observations that women are embodied much in the same way as men are embodied (82).
Both men and women are embodied by God, and according to the same (physical) laws (82). The union of mind and body in women, as in men, is subject to the same passions and feelings, and directed by the same will (82). Anatomically, there exists no difference between the brains of men and women (83). Sense perception functions in the same way in both sexes (83). Objects perceived by the senses are represented to the imagination and stored in the memory by like processes in both (83). There is not, then, a kind of union in the case of women which differs functionally from the kind of union in the case of men.
(P3) arises from (P1) and (P2).
Since the state of being embodied is fundamentally the same between the sexes, it can be claimed that the minds of women do not different substantially from the minds of men (P3).
(P4) follows from (P3).
Poulain seeks to corroborate this by an enumeration and exposition of the various sciences which women can be privy to (83–85), namely, those which involve the use of the: (i) senses (physics, medicine, astronomy), as well as (ii) reason (metaphysics, mathematics, logic) and (iii) the passions (psychology, civil affairs).
The minds of women are just as capable of understanding and obtaining knowledge with respect to these sciences. Women are thus generally as capable of performing whatever functions and serving whatever roles the pursuit of that knowledge, or its execution, entails.
(P5) follows from (P4), and thus (c). In accordance with this argument, (SB) and its entailed beliefs (i-iii) have been refuted.
An evaluation of Poulain’s argument: the unsexed mind and gender dysphoria
The logical format and the examples which Poulain musters for his argument are intuitive. The premises, implied premises, and conclusion fit together in such a way so as to provide a solid defense against a would-be opponent of equality between the sexes. I question, however, a background belief which underpins all of Poulain’s arguments for the substantialequality of the minds of men and women: that the mind is unsexed (82).
I set aside, for the moment, traditional critiques of Cartesian substance dualism (for example, the question of how exactly the mind and body interact given that they are different substances).
Working within the framework of Poulain’s logic, his overall argument suffers no loss if this claim were to be excluded. The minds of men and women differ in the same way as minds differ within a single sex: content, not capability. The content of the mind is determined by, among other things, education and the effects of the external environment on the individual (82). Many of the claims of faults levied against women may be attributed to the education (or lack thereof) which they receive (110). Their supposed faults are not a result of a defect by nature, but a stifling of capabilities produced by custom and habit, forces external to themselves and their control (110).
My concern (in voicing this) is that this claim might have “unsightly” implications for the debate concerning gender dysphoria.
A Cartesian who upholds this view (that the mind is unsexed) would have to furnish a sufficient explanatory account and causal account of why gender dysphoria arises and appears in the way that it does (e.g., why there is an apparent phenomenology of being sexed beyond the natural body, gender[3]). Perhaps they would respond that the phenomenology of the mind being sexed (or appearing to be so) is a product of the union, and that the mind understood in itself, separate from the embodied state, is itself unsexed (because it is immaterial and non-extended).
Footnotes:
[1] Hereafter, for brevity’s sake, “Poulain”.
[2] Though, admittedly, this is just one vector in which the argument is fielded.
[3] If this can be claimed, as I would like to maintain.
Works Cited:
Barre François Poulain de La. Three Cartesian Feminist Treatises. Edited by Marcelle Maistre Welch. Translated by Vivien Bosley, University of Chicago Press, 2002.