Stoic determinism, agency, and moral psychology.
“Just as a target is not set up to be missed,” claims Epictetus, “so what is bad by nature does occur in the universe.”
The question of how there can be some such thing as evil in a universe which is permeated and governed by providence was as pressing and perplexing in the time of Epictetus and Neronian Rome, as it was in the time of Cleanthes and the early years of the Stoa, and is a perennial problem for modern Stoics who subscribe to any notion of providence or determinism (e.g., such as myself).
Much of what follows in this piece has been prompted by a close reading of Cleanthes’ Hymn to Zeus, a work which makes uncomfortably cogent several problems for Stoic determinism, and I can’t tell whether that was intentional.
Nature, fate, and providence
Fundamental to the Stoic conception of nature (thus, likewise to Stoic ethical theory), is the notion of fate as the divine, rational ordering of the universe in accordance with which all events are determined. The universe in itself is conceived as a complex and interwoven series of causal connections, no event taking part apart from the reason (the logos) of Zeus. The universe and its inner-workings thus unfolds in accordance with a rational plan (an oikonomia).The intelligibility of nature (and thus the fundamental understanding of virtue) is dependent upon this deterministic of the universe as it unfurls via a complex of causes and effects. Each event can be understood and is intelligible with reference to that which causally precedes and succeeds it.
What this calls into question, then, is, the first (1) concern, how there can be moral responsibility on the part of any agent – especially given the description of the rule of providence in accounts like those of Cleanthes’ Hymn to Zeus, where it is acknowledged that everything that occurs in the world is a product of providence, and that there are immoral agents who act in the world.
In order to understand how moral responsibility is possible in the Stoic view, it is necessary to first elaborate on their deterministic theory.
Causal agency and compatibilism
There are two kinds of causal agency in the Stoic conception: the first (i) being external, and the second (ii) being internal. External causes are controlled directly by fate(by Zeus), and affect bodies (e.g., a stone can be pushed, which causes it to roll). Internal causes are determined by the “nature” of the body affected (e.g., a stone is able to roll by virtue of it being somewhat round). Every event which occurs in the universe is brought about by the joint operation of these two causes.
The behavior of a being (e.g., a stone), thus, is in accordance with the external causes which affect it (e.g., a push), and the internal causes which arise through its nature (e.g., a stone can be rolled because it is round). To say that every event which occurs in nature is determined (e.g., the behavior of a stone, or of a complex creature such as human being), is to say that every event is brought about by the conjunction of these causes.The problem which arises is the following: if external causes are determined by fate, and internal causes are a product of nature, then statements regarding moral responsibility and virtue and vice are vacuous, because the actions of an agent are determined by Zeus. This argument, however, disregards the complexity of certain internal causes, and namely two concepts relevant to human action which were aforementioned: impulse and assent .
Agency: humans are not automata
Human beings, given that they possess reason, are able to process and analyze the sense data (the propositional content) of their impressions, and act (to choose between possible actions) accordingly. Human actions, unlike the behavior of certain animals, or in contrast to the behavior of natural phenomena, are not produced automatically.
Human actions require the assent of the rational agent to the content of a cognitive impression in order to produce an impulse, in accordance with which the agent acts. As virtue and vice are claimed to be acquired dispositions of the soul resulting from training (or, conversely, neglect) of an agent’s assent, moral character is something which can be developed. While whatever occurs in nature occurs in accordance with causal laws and the plan (oikonomia) of Zeus, that humans possess, in accordance with their own nature, reason, does not remove the possibility or necessity of moral responsibility.
Bibliography:
- Long, A. A. “The Stoic Concept of Evil.” The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-), vol. 18, no. 73, 1968, pp. 329–343. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2217794.
- Saunders, Jason Lewis and Saunders, Jason L Greek and Roman philosophy after Aristotle. The Free Press, New York, 1966.
- Stough, Charlotte. “Stoic Determinism and Moral Responsibility.” Ed. John M. Rist The Stoics. University of California Press. 1978. 203–232.
- Thom, Johan C. “THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN CLEANTHES’ ‘HYMN TO ZEUS.’” Acta Classica, vol. 41, 1998, pp. 45–57. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24595412.