How do we change who we are as people? And where do we begin?
Anguish, Sartre claims, is to be understood as the perpetual modifiability of one’s fundamental project (Sartre 262). Sartre defines this fundamental project as neither instantaneousnor non-temporal (267). As it is manifested in the world by means of choices (which are themselves temporal), the fundamental project elapses over time – it is continuous (267). The moment of conversion, however, the radical modification of one’s original project, is described as instantaneous(262). The sudden nature of conversion itself is no detriment to Sartre’s account of the fundamental project. Sartre, however, makes no mention of the time which elapses between the moment of conversion and the assumption of the fundamental project.
At any moment, he claims, one can invert the flow of one’s life (262). This seems only partially correct.
The intent of this paper is bipartite:
firstly (1), I intend to critique Sartre’s account of conversion in relation to the fundamental project, with regard to its paradoxical treatment of temporality, and its infeasibility, and,
secondly (2), I will use this critique to argue for the embodiment of a conversion process in a fleshly, non-thetic consciousness.
The ability to modify the fundamental project is ever present to consciousness (262). Just as consciousness is threatened by its capacity for choice, it is haunted by the looming possibility that it may subvert that choice (262). Consciousness, because of its nihilating, transcendent nature, is always condemned to choose (262). The moment of conversion is the very subversion of this prior project in favor of a different end. This, however, produces a radical upheaval of one’s being. Conversion does not simply affect how consciousnessprojects itselfinto the world, but produces a radical change in how consciousness experiences itselfin the world (262). In order to understand why this is the case, it is necessary to adumbrate the fundamental project.
The fundamental project isa certain flight of consciousness beforefacticity(258). It _is_the choice the for-itself makes when faced with the problem of being, composing itself in accordance with an absolute, desired end (258). Th_is_end, Sartre claims, _is__a desired synthes__is__with the _in-itself, in order to produce the “quasi-panthe_istic” for-itself-in-itself (258). Consciousness strives toward th__is_end by choosing to manifest itself in the world in a certa_in_ way, as a specific being-in-the-world (258). The fundamental project _is__th__is__manner of be_in_g-_in-the-world (258). The world, in be_in_g chosen, reflects the image of consciousness back at itself, forcing consciousness to perceive how it assumes its being-in-the-world (260). In the case of Sartre’s hikin_g trip, for example, the fatigue which he feels _is__the very_facticity_of h__is__consciousness (256). H__is__reluctance to cont_in_ue hik_in_g _in the face of h_is_fatigue _is__an expression of h__is__choice of fundamental project (256–257). As the fundamental project __is__constituted by choice, by a _series_of choices, it elapses _over_time. It ex_is_ts both _in and overtime, as it __is_realized through the choices of consciousness.
The issue with this account of the fundamental project only becomes apparent in Sartre’s portrayal of conversion. He claims that the fundamental project may be abruptly subverted by a choice which is contrary to it. This account of conversion is paradoxical for two reasons: firstly (1), in that the moment of conversion is described as abrupt, and (2), that the difficulty associated with conversion is understated. That the moment of conversion is abrupt begs the question concerning when and where it begins in the course of the fundamental project.
Sartre describes the choice to convert as groundless, or unjustifiable (262). It (choice, generally) emits from a contingency of the in-itself (262). Choice itself is not founded in any prior human reality, butserves as the foundation for further human complexes or significations – for subsequent choices (262). Choice, in other words, has no foundation, butis nonetheless chosen and serves as the basis for other choices (262). This conflicts starkly with Sartre’s depiction of his fatigue, which presents the realityof the fundamental project (the way it manifests in a self and situation) as almost inescapable.
Theway in which hesuffers his fatigue is “chosen”, but only “chosen” as theresult of other, prior choices (prior realities). His prior choices have molded theworld in such a way that heexperiences it(theworld) as defatigable. He suffers it(his fatigue), but not as willed(i.e., desired) in that present moment, merely as theresult of actions of prior consciousnesses (264). It (his fatigue) is thereflection of an original relation to thein-itself which hechose to assume (e.g. as an “importunate phenomenon”) at a former time (259–260). Yet, theability to assume his fatigue as otherwise (i.e. portunately) does not seem feasible, given theway in which theworld seems to present itself, as determined by his present project. It seems to be in such a way that itcould not be otherwise.Theway in which one experiences their ability to choose (their agency), to some degree, seems to be grounded in one’s prior realities. If Sartre were to attempt a conversion (say, from suffering to enjoying fatigue), itis unclear from this account how, where, and when hewould attempt to do so. Conversion seems to be made infeasible by thetrend (themomentum) of thefundamental project, both in terms of its difficulty to be subverted, and its flawed temporality. In order for itto be made feasible in theway that Sartre describes – as a sudden upheaval, as a radical re-evaluation of one’s fundamental project – I positthree revisions: firstly (1), that themoment of conversion be understood, not as instantaneous, but as a process, secondly (2), that this conversion process and thefundamental project be rooted (founded) in thenon-thetic consciousness, and, thirdly (3), that this non-thetic consciousness be incorporated in such a way as resembling Merleau-Ponty’s body schema.
Given the difficulty of subverting the fundamental project, and given the extension of this project through time, conversion should be understood,notas a moment, but as a process. The process view would adequately account for the disparity in time between the assumption of the initial, fundamental project and its subversion. For example, Sartre is aware that the imposition of his fatigue is, ultimately, the result of a co-expression of himself and the world (255–6). He suffers his fatigue,notonly because the world seems to impose it on him, but also because he is (has constructed himself to be) the sort of person who suffers fatigue, rather than enjoys it. Conversion, understood as a process which is: (a) undergone slowly, (b) developed gradually,©culminating in a moment, (d) and established by means of choice (in the same manner as the fundamental project) would offer a more satisfying account of how conversion could possibly happen. In the context of a process, the change would occur over time, but ultimately reach a climax, wherein the metamorphosis is fully realized as a subversion of one’s former project. It would be possible, for Sartre, through an arduous process ofreconditioning, re-interpretinghis past and his future projects, to experience his fatiguenotas something to be suffered (262, 270). It would, however, require a series of choices which would coalesce in such a way to change his experience of being-in-the-world.
The actual content of the conversion (and by extension,the fundamental project),quantified as a seriesof choices and actions,must be understood as founded in the non-thetic consciousness. My reasoning is thus: the world “imparts” its meaning onto consciousness at the level of the non-thetic consciousness (258). It is here that one has a non-positional consciousness of being embodied; the sun is felt asburning,the slopes of hills as steep,and the road asinterminable (258). It is also here that the self becomes present to consciousness (198),and that the world seems to present to consciousness its various possibilities(e.g. being climbable),these possibilitiesbeing or becoming structures of subjectivity (265),as determined by the fundamental project (261). If the world is experienced as affected at this level,and this affect is a manifestation of one’s fundamental project,then necessarily any subversion of the fundamental project would occur here. This would also explain the difficulty associated with conversion itself. If the process is founded in,and begins at,the level of non-thetic consciousness,the relationship that consciousness has with the world it inhabits is much less cognitively or psychologically tractable. It becomes,more deeply,a psychosomatic,existential relationship. Much greater emphasis is placed on the body,and how this lived experience of the body affects the function of consciousness. The task of conversion,then,becomes not merely to convince the conscious mind of a choice in contrast to its chosen project,but to make this choice cling to the non-thetic consciousness,at the non-positional,somatic,existential level. I theorize that this would occur through a kind of simultaneous physical and mental conditioning,whereby the will to convert becomes more ingrained in the non-thetic consciousness,and thereafter consciousness itself.
This culminates in the attribution of facets of conscious subjectivity to the body. Non-thetic consciousness, in being the recipient of certain affected states of consciousness such as shame (199), which affects both the body (as body) and consciousness (as consciousness of the body), already has a close relationship to the body. To locate intentionality here, as Merleau-Ponty does, would also explain both the arduousness of the conversion process and its corresponding length (Young 36). The world unfolds in new ways when one places emphasis on the body as pure presence to the world, as openness to its possibilities (36). Conversion of the fleshly non-thetic consciousness would amount to radically changing the way one views and assumes their own embodiment as a fundamental project (36). This acclimation to a new manner of embodying oneself, the adaptation period, would elapse an amount of time corresponding to the radicality of the change. The conversion process itself also takes on new meaning with the introduction of a situation. The manner of lived bodily experience, thus its conversion, is also defined by a situation (36).
Works Cited
- Sartre, Jean Paul. The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre. Edited by Robert Denoon Cumming, Vintage Books, 1972. Print.
- Young, Marion.On Female Body Experience. New York, Oxford University Press, 2005. Print.